Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2002

Cathy Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc. : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
D. Gilbert Athay; Attorney for Respondent.
Max D. Wheeler; Stephen J. Hill; Stanley J. Preston; Snow, Christensen, and Martineau; Attorneys
for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Cathy Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 20590.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2067

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU

45.9
.S9

2OS10

DOCKET NO
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CATHY BREHANY,
Plaintiff/Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,
vs.
NORDSTROM, INC.,
Defendant/Appellant/
Cross-Respondent.

A^
DENNIS KNAPP and BARBARA KNAPP,
his wife,
Plaintiffs/Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
vs.
NORDSTROM, INC.,
Defendant/Appellant/
Cross-Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF

D. GILBERT ATHAY
Attorney for Respondents
72 East 400 South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7074

Max D. Wheeler
Stephen J. Hill
Stanley J. Preston
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Appellant
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FILED
JULE 51986
m^rir Surname Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CATHY BREHANY,
Plaintiff/Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,
vs.
NORDSTROM, INC.,
Defendant/Appellant/
Cross-Respondent.
DENNIS KNAPP and BARBARA KNAPP,
his wife,
Plaintiffs/Respondents/
Cross-Appellants,
vs.
NORDSTROM, INC.,
Defendant/Appellant/
Cross-Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF
Max D. Wheeler
Stephen J. Hill
Stanley J. Preston
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Appellant
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
D. GILBERT ATHAY
Attorney for Respondents
72 East 400 South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7074
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENT
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

. .

ii

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

ARGUMENT

3

. . . . . . . . . .

POINT I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISION
IN ROSE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT PLAINTIFFS
DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF AN
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING . . .
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR CONTRACTUAL WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE AND DEFAMATION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED . . . . .
A.

The Trial Court Properly Granted a
Directed Verdict as to Plaintiffs'
Contractual Wrongful Discharge Claims . . .
1.

2.

B.

Under Rose Plaintiffs Have No
Actionable Claim for Contractual
Wrongful Discharge

1.

2.
3.

8

8

8

The Nordstrom Policy Manual Does Not
Create a Binding Employment Agreement
to Terminate Only for Cause

The Trial Court Properly Granted a
Directed Verdict as to Plaintiffs'
Defamation Claims

4

12

...

20

Defendant's Alleged Defamatory
Statements Are Qualifiedly Privileged
and Were Made Without Malice

22

All Alleged Defamatory Statements
Made by Defendants Were True

31

Plaintiffs' Defamation Claim is
Defeated by Plaintiffs' Publication
of the Alleged Defamatory Statements .

32

CONCLUSION

33

-i-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Page
Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286 (Utah 1984)

...

Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979) . .

31

4, 5, 8, 10

Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.,
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960)

9

Church of Scientology of California, Inc. v. Green,
354 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)

32

Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co, 119 Utah 407, 228
P.2d 272 (1951)

22

Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952)

. .

31

Deaile v. General Telephone Co., 40 Cal. App. 3d 841,
115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974)

23

Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1976)

30

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct.
2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)

.

Haddad v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 526 F.2d 83
(6th Cir. 1976)

26

Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095
(Del. 1982)

13, 14

Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52,
551 P.2d 779 (1976)
Kemper v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1973)

28

. . " '
19
.

32

Kroger Co. v. Young, 210 Va. 564, 172 S.E.2d 720 (1970) .

24

Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97
(Me. 1984)

17, 18

Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983)

22, 30

-iiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss. 609, 157 So.
705 (1934)

24

New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964)

27

Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976)

27, 31

Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College,
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981)

17

Ponticelli v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 104 R.I. 549,
247 A.2d 303 (1968)

24

Reid v. Sears Roebuck & Co, 790 F.2d 453
(6th Cir. 1986)

18

Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395
(Utah 1977)

23

Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83
(Utah 1986)

4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12, 18

Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910
(E.D. Mich. 1977)

19

Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981) . . . .

27

Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp.,
655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983)

17, 18

Shaw v. S. S. Kresge, Co., 167 Ind. App. 1,
328 N.E.2d 775 (1975)

13, 14

Shoemaker v. Friedberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 911,
183 P.2d 318 (1947)

32

Sowell v. IML Freight, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 446,
519 P.2d 884 (1974)

23

St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
88 S. Ct. 1323, 20 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1968)

27, 28

Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,
408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)

15, 16

Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc.,
420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984)

-iiiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458,
443 N.E.2d 441 (1982)

16, 17

Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Co.,
83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933)

27

Statutes Cited
Utah Code Ann. § 5-2-3(3) (1953, as amended)

25

Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2 (1953, as amended)

32

Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(3) (1953, as amended)

22

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-506 (1953, as amended)

......

22

....

32

Other Authorities Cited
Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 558 (1977)
Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 594 (1977)

22

Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 595 (1977)

25

-iv-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in Nordstrom1s opening
brief is accurate and fairly states the evidence produced at
trial according to the requirement that this court review the
facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
The undisputed facts establish that Nordstrom employed all
three plaintiffs for an indefinite term, R. C82-5828 at 508,
and that plaintiffs were terminable at-will employees properly
dischargeable at any time, for any reason.
The issuance of

the Nordstrom

Tr. Vol. V at 192.

History,

Policy and

Regulations ("Nordstrom Manual") to the plaintiffs was not a
part of the contractual agreement between the parties and was
intended only as an introduction to the company for new
employees.

Tr. Vol. V, at 40. Dennis Knapp testified that the

manuals were handed out in training
employees were hired.

sessions after new

Tr. Vol. II, at 29-31.

Cathy Brehany

specifically admitted that she did not receive the manual until
after she had been hired.

Tr. Vol. II, at 123. Additionally,

Dennis Knapp testified that the Nordstrom manual did not set
forth the exclusive grounds or procedures for terminating
Nordstrom employees.

Tr. Vol. II, at 76.

Nordstrom conducted a reasonable investigation to discover
and prevent illegal drug use among employees.

Tr. Vol. IV,

106, 107-108, 110-118, 156-57, 166-168, 177, 196-197, 213-217,

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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228-229; Tr. Vol. V, 114, 117, 222-225; Tr. Vol. VI, 46-54,
58.

As outlined

in Nordstrom's

opening

brief, after

the

investigation revealed that plaintiffs engaged in illegal drug
use, failed

to take any action to discourage drug use by

Nordstrom employees under their supervision, or otherwise aided
Nordstrom employees to obtain such drugs, Nordstrom discharged
plaintiffs.

Brief of Appellant, at p.8.

Plaintiffs*

statement of facts goes beyond the evidence

produced at trial and the reasonable inferences which might be
made therefrom

to the extent

that plaintiffs contend that

Nordstrom defamed plaintiffs by recklessly communicating false
information regarding their discharge.
record below

indicates

To the contrary, the

that James Nordstrom, president

of

Nordstrom, met with buyers and other management-level employees
of the Crossroads Plaza Nordstrom store on July 20, 1981, and,
according

to most

witnesses, in response to questioning,

explained that Dennis Knapp was terminated for poor judgment
concerning a drug-related problem.

Tr. Vol. II, 109, 110, 188,

189, 190; Vol. Ill, 96, 97, 98, 104, 205, 206.

The testimony

among plaintiffs' own witnesses was conflicting as to whether,
in response to a further question, Mr. Nordstrom stated that
the managers should tell their employees that Knapp1s termination had to do with drugs, or should tell them nothing at all.
Tr. Vol. II, 189-90; Vol. Ill, 104, 179-80.

-2-
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Darrel Hume, Dennis Knapp's replacement as general manager,
attended another meeting of buyers and managers and, although
there are discrepancies in the testimony, apparently stated in
essence that Nordstrom would not tolerate the use of illegal
drugs, and that anyone using drugs should resign.

Tr. Vol.

Ill, 98, 99, 126, 127, 133, 134; Vol. IV, 21, 22.
ARGUMENT
This brief addresses two major points.

The brief first

replies to plaintiffs/respondents' arguments in opposition to
Nordstrom1s appeal.

The central issue raised by Nordstrom1s

appeal is whether the district court erred in ruling that
plaintiffs, as indefinite term, at-will employees, had a right
of action against Nordstrom for breach of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing upon being discharged.
The brief next addresses the issues raised in plaintiffs1
cross appeal.

In their cross appeal, plaintiffs argue that the

district court erred in dismissing their claim for wrongful
discharge based on a breach of an implied contract, and their
claim for defamation.

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT I
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S RECENT DECISION IN
ROSE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHES THAT PLAINTIFFS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
BREACH OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING.
In its opening brief, Nordstrom argued that Utah law does
not recognize a good faith exception to the at-will rule,
citing a number of Utah cases culminating in this court's 1979
decision in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).
Nordstrom further argued that Utah's rejection of a good faith
exception to the at-will rule was consistent with the majority
of the states who have categorically refused to recognize such
an exception.

In response, plaintiffs stated that, "[t]he

Supreme Court of Utah has never decided a case directly on
point" on the good faith issue.

Brief of Respondents, at 6.

Since the filing of these initial briefs, however, this court
has done exactly that in Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719
P.2d 83 (Utah 1986.).

Nordstrom contends that Rose disposes of

the good faith issue in favor of Nordstrom.
The plaintiff in Rose was hired as an assistant manager of
a shoe department pursuant to an oral employment agreement for
an indefinite term.

The plaintiff subsequently received rapid
i

promotions until he became the manager of the shoe department
and his managerial responsibility extended to several stores.

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiff then approached his supervisor about the possibility
of attending school while continuing work.

On two occasions

his supervisor essentially told him that he could return to
school and keep working so long as he met certain conditions in
performing his job duties.

The plaintiff returned to college

and his employer subsequently received complaints about his
work performance which eventually led to his termination.
Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit asserting claims for breach
of contract, promissory estoppel, contractual wrongful discharge, tortious wrongful discharge, and breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Id., at 84. The lower

court subsequently granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment after determining that the plaintiff's employment was
"at-will."
On appeal, this court carefully considered the nature of
the plaintiff's employment

contract

for the

purpose of

determining whether it fit within one of the very limited
exceptions to the at-will rule recognized in Bihlmaier.
two exceptions are:

These

(1) whether there is an "express or

implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment"; or
(2) whether there is "a good consideration in addition to the
services contracted to be rendered." Icl- at 85, citing,
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979).
Most of this court's analysis in Rose is more directly
relevant to the issue of the implied contract exception to the
-5-
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at-will rule raised by plaintiffs* cross-appeal, and will,
accordingly, be discussed in detail below.

With respect to

good faith issue, it is sufficient to note that in Rose this
court concluded that the employee "had merely an employment
contract of indefinite duration that could be terminated at
will by either . . . [the employer] or . . . [the employee]
without cause."

Ijd. at 87.

Significantly, because this court

determined that the employee's contract

in Rose remained

terminable at-will, this court held that it was "not necessary
to address the merits of the employee's other contentions."
Id.

In other words, this court concluded in Rose that because

the plaintiff was an at-will employee, he did not have a cause
of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and it was not even necessary to reach the issue
of the good faith claim on appeal.
This holding is dispositive in favor of Nordstrom on the
good faith issue raised in this appeal.

As in Rose, the

undisputed evidence in the case at bar establishes that the
plaintiffs were at-will employees.

Plaintiffs admitted at

trial that they were employed by Nordstrom for an indefinite
period of time.

R. C82-5828, 508.

Consistent with the

evidence, the district court below properly held with respect
to plaintiffs' employment that:
Tr. Vol. V, 192.

"It's an employment at-will."

Accordingly, because plaintiffs were at-will

-6-
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employees, under Rose they have no cause of action for breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
This court's rejection of a good faith exception to the
at-will rule is consistent with the majority of states who have
considered this issue.

In its opening

brief, Nordstrom

discussed in detail the leading cases outlining the majority
position rejecting a good faith exception.

As set forth on

page 21 of Nordstrom's opening brief, the majority of states
have rejected a good faith exception for several compelling
reasons.

Nordstrom respectfully refers this court to that

discussion and submits that its rejection of the good faith
exception can be properly based on these same reasons.
In its opening brief Nordstrom also discussed how the few
states which have created an exception to the at-will rule by
allowing recovery for breach of an implied covenant of good
faith

and

fair

dealing,

principally

New

Hampshire,

Massachusetts and California, have done so under certain
limited circumstances which are not present in this case.

In

any event, in light of this court's recent consideration and
rejection of the good faith exception in the Rose case, those
few courts which have recognized a good faith exception to the
at-will rule have taken a position contrary to the law of this
state and, therefore, do not offer persuasive authority for
plaintiffs' position.

-7-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS1
CLAIMS FOR CONTRACTUAL WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
AND DEFAMATION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
A,

The Trial Court Properly Granted a Directed Verdict as
to Plaintiffs' Contractual Wrongful Discharge Claims.
1.

Under Rose Plaintiffs Have No Actionable Claim
for Contractual Wrongful Discharge.

In their cross appeal, plaintiffs ask this court to reverse
the district court's dismissal of their contractual wrongful
discharge claim on the basis of what they allege to be an
implied contract.

Nordstrom contends that the Rose decision is

dispositive in favor of Nordstrom on this issue as well.
The question of whether the lower court properly dismissed
plaintiffs' contractual wrongful discharge claim hinges upon
whether plaintiffs had "some further express or implied stipulation as to the duration of their employment."

If not, each

plaintiff's employment was nothing more than an indefinite
general hiring

terminable at the will of either party.

Bihlmaier, supra, 603 P.2d at 792.
Rose sets forth the standard for analyzing whether the
plaintiffs herein had an implied stipulation as to the duration
of employment whereby they avoid the at-will rule.

As in the

case at bar, the plaintiff in Rose was hired for an indefinite
period and there was no written formalized agreement.

-8-
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719 P.2d

at 83-84.

The plaintiff in Rose argued, however, that his

indefinite term, at-will employment contract "metamorphasized"
into a contract for a definite term which could only be
terminated for cause based on two conversations with his
supervisor.

As discussed above, the plaintiff in Rose argued

that he understood that his job would continue while he
attended school so long as he met certain conditions regarding
his duties, and was entitled to rely on that understanding.
This court rejected that argument, holding that the supervisor's statements could not be "construed as a promise of
continuous employment."

Id.

at 86.

Specifically, this court

stated that "the existence of an employment agreement not
terminable at will must be established by more than subjective
understandings or expectations."

Ij3.

The court found that

there was no evidence that the supervisor "intended to forfeit
his right to terminate plaintiff, any more than plaintiff
intended to forfeit his right to terminate employment with
. . . [the employer] if a better opportunity arose."

Id.

Additionally, this court "refused to override the at-will
doctrine to imply a term of employment in . . . contract[s] to
which the employer had not expressly agreed."
added.]

Id.

[Emphasis

at 87, explaining Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck

Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960).

-9-
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Based on this

analysis, this court held in Rose that the plaintiffs employment contract was of indefinite duration, that there were no
express or implied stipulations to the contrary, and that the
plaintiffs employment could be terminated at will without
Id.

cause.

at 86-87.

Applying the Rose analysis to this case, it is similarly
clear that the plaintiffs herein were also at-will employees
who could be terminated without cause and who have no cause of
action for wrongful discharge based on contract.

In fact,

plaintiffs stated in their Trial Memorandum that they "were
employed by defendant Nordstrom . . . for an indefinite term."
R. C82-5828 at 508.

This should be the end of the court's

inquiry.
Plaintiffs apparently take the position, however, that they
fit within the Bihlmaier exception of an express or implied
stipulation as to the duration of employment as the result of
certain

provisions

in

the Nordstrom

manual

and

participation in Nordstrom's profit sharing plan.

their
If anything,

Rose presents a more compelling case for the existence of an
implied stipulation as to duration of employment than does this
case.

At least in Rose, the plaintiff relied upon specific

conversations with his supervisor wherein the supervisor stated
that the employee could continue working and go to school so
long as he met certain conditions in performing his job

-10-
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duties.

In this case, there is no evidence that plaintiffs had

any conversations with anyone in Nordstrom1s management regarding the duration of their employment or certain conditions they
had to meet for continued employment.

More importantly, there

is absolutely no evidence of any agreements or representations,
oral or written, between the parties that plaintiffs1 employment should continue for a period of time that was either
definite or capable of being determined.

Under Rose, there-

fore, plaintiffs were at-will employees with no right of action
upon being discharged.
The mere fact that plaintiffs, as well as every other
employee

of

Nordstrom, was

offered

the opportunity to

participate in the profit sharing plan cannot be viewed as an
implied stipulation by Nordstrom of job security or continued
employment for any identifiable duration.

The profit sharing

plan was neither bargained for nor given in exchange for any
promise.

It was merely one of the benefits of working for

Nordstrom; it did not create an obligation to extend employment
terms.
Similarly, the mere existence of the Nordstrom manual does
not, under the standards set forth in Rose, rise to the level
of an express or implied stipulation as to the duration of
employment.

James Nordstrom specifically testified that the

Nordstrom manual was given to the employees for the purpose of

-11-
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introducing them to the company.

Tr. Vol. V at 40.

Plaintiffs

allege that because the manual identifies certain offenses
which "may result in immediate dismissal" (see Exhibit P-1 at
pp. 23-24), it gives rise to an implied agreement not to
terminate at-will employees such as plaintiff except for cause.
Obviously, in taking this position, plaintiffs are relying
upon their own understanding as to the implied agreement
arising from these provisions in the manual.

Under Rose, "the

existence of an employment agreement not terminable at will
must be established by more than subjective understandings or
expectations."

719 P.2d at 86.

As in Rose, there is no

evidence that Nordstrom intended to forfeit its right to
terminate plaintiffs' employment

any more than plaintiffs

intended to forfeit their right to terminate employment with
Nordstrom, if a better opportunity arose.

In short, in this

case, as in Rose, this court should refuse to override the
at-will rule by implying any term of employment for plaintiffs,
because the record contains no evidence

that

Nordstrom

expressly agreed to any such term.
2.

The Nordstrom Policy Manual Does Not Create a
Binding Employment Agreement to Terminate Only
For Cause.

The conclusion mandated by Rose, that the Nordstrom manual
does not create an implied contract, is supported by the case

-12-
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law in the majority of the states which have considered whether
an employee handbook or manual creates an implied contract
exception to the at-will rule.

For example, several courts

have rejected the argument advanced by plaintiffs that an
employee handbook which states grounds or procedures for
termination
contract.

is metamorphasized

into a binding employment

In Shaw v. S. S. Kresge, Co. , 167 Ind. App. 1, 328

N.E.2d 775 (1975), an employee handbook provided that an
employee would receive three warning notices before being
discharged.

The plaintiff there alleged that at the time of

termination he had not received the three warning notices and
that the handbook's provision for warning notices constituted
the exclusive method for discharge.

The court rejected that

claim, holding that the handbook did not limit the employer's
right to discharge the employee at-will because nowhere did the
employer promise employment for a fixed period of time, and
nowhere did the employee limit his right to quit work at his
will.

The handbook's provisions, therefore, did not affect the

fact that the employment relationship could be terminated at
the will of either party.

Id..,

328 N.E.2d at 779.

Similarly, in the recent case of Heideck v. Kent General
Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982), an employee filed a
wrongful discharge claim asserting that she could not be
terminated for an offense not listed in the employment manual.

-13-
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The employee argued that because the manual set forth a list of
offenses for which an employee may be discharged, the employer
thereby impliedly promised that an employee would not be
discharged for any cause other than those listed.

The Delaware

Supreme Court rejected this claim, stating that the manual did
not create a contract, and upheld the discharge, explaining
that "the examples cited were not inclusive, but illustrative;
hence, the fact that plaintiff's offense was not explicitly
listed . . . [in the manual] is of no consequence."

^d. at

1097.
Both Heideck and Shaw are directly on point in this case.
The mere fact that the Nordstrom manual unilaterally lists
certain conduct that "may result in immediate dismissal" does
not limit the nature of plaintiffs* at-will employment, nor
does it create a binding agreement that Nordstrom can only
discharge employees for the conduct listed.

As in Heideck, the

Nordstrom manual merely lists some of the reasons for which an
employee can be dismissed.

The use of the word "may" indicates

that the examples cited are illustrative, not inclusive.
Dennis Knapp, himself, acknowledged that manager-made policy
regularly governed employee terminations.

Specifically, Dennis

Knapp testified that employees could be terminated for offenses
other than those listed in the Nordstrom manual, at the
discretion of management:

-14-
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Q.

Well, you knew that an employee could be fired,
for example, for things not listed in that
manual? (Indicating.)

A.

Each manager made their own policy, yes.

Q.

You say you as a manager could set a policy that
even went beyond that manual where you could fire
people; is that right?

A.

Some things that took place in stores that were
not provided for in this manual, yes.

Q.

They were fireable offenses?

A.

If it was my opinion as the manager they were,
yes.

Tr. Vol. II at 76.

Thus, by plaintiffs' own admission there

was no express or implied agreement to terminate employees only
for the grounds listed in the manual.
Plaintiffs' attempt to support the proposition that the
Nordstrom manual gives rise to an implied contract exception to
the at-will rule by citing what they claim are the "most
significant" cases which "limit and confine" the termination
at-will doctrine.

However, the primary authorities cited by

plaintiffs do not support plaintiffs' argument because they are
distinguishable from this case in that they involve situations
where there were express provisions in a handbook or express
oral representations as to job security.

Obviously these are

factors which are lacking in this case.
For example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980), upon
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which plaintiffs rely, the court merely enforced a right that
arose out of a promise not to terminate except for cause.

No

such promise exists in the instant case.
Furthermore,

the

Supreme

Court of Michigan

recently

clarified its holding in Toussaint as follows:
Toussaint makes employment contracts which provide
that an employee will not be dismissed except for
cause enforceable in the same manner as other
contracts. It did not recognize employment as a
fundamental right or create a new "special" right.
The only right held in Toussaint to be enforceable was
the right that arose out of the promise not to
terminate except for cause.
Employers and employees remain free to provide, or not
to provide, for job security. Absent a contractual
provision for job security, either the employer or the
employee may ordinarily terminate an employment
contract at any time for any, or no, reason.
[Emphasis added.]
Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256,
258-59, 362 N.W. 2d 628 (1984) (footnote omitted).
Similarly,

plaintiffs

rely

heavily

on

Weiner

v.

McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y. 2d 458, 443 N.E. 2d 441 (1982).

In

Weiner, the plaintiff was invited to enter into discussions
with defendant's representative regarding the possibility of
plaintiff leaving his current employment to join defendant's
firm.

During these discussions, defendant's representative

assured plaintiff that his company's firm policy was not to
terminate employees without "just cause," and, therefore, that
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if he transferred his employment he would have job security.
At the time the plaintiff signed his employment application
with the defendant, the application further stated that his
employment would be subject to the provisions of defendant's
handbook, which specifically provided as follows:
The company will resort to dismissal for just and
sufficient cause only, and only after all practical
steps toward rehabilitation or salvage of the employee
have been taken and failed.
Id. 443 N.E.2d at 442.

Thus, in contrast to this case, the

plaintiff in Weiner was relying on express oral and written
representations

regarding

dismissal

with cause prior to

accepting the new employment.
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 626 P.2d 1063
(Utah 1981), upon which plaintiffs also rely, provides no
support for plaintiffs' argument that a personnel manual or
handbook may give rise to a binding contract.

There the Utah

Supreme Court stated that it did not reach the issue of whether
or not the personnel manual was binding on the employer because
the court was bound by res judicata, since the lower court's
decision on that issue was not appealed.

626 P.2d at 1064,

n. 5.
Finally, in Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97
(Me. 1984), and in Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655
S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983), the courts in both cases held that
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parties may enter into an employment contract terminable only
pursuant to its express terms—as

"for cause"—by clearly

stating their intention to do so.

Thus, contrary to plain-

tiffs1 position, the courts in Larrabee and in Shah stated only
a narrow exception to the at-will rule which is limited to an
express agreement to terminate only for cause.

This, of

course, is similar to the narrow exception stated by this court
in Rose and, it must be emphasized, is inapplicable in this
case because there are no clear or express promises by
Nordstrom to employ plaintiffs for any definite period of time,
or to terminate them for cause only.
Finally, it is significant to note that numerous cases have
rejected attempts to engraft employee manuals or handbooks onto
employment contracts.

Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d

453 (6th Cir. 1986) is representative of these cases.

In Reid,

the Sixth Circuit held that:
We do not believe the listing of causes that "may
result in the termination of your employment" in the
Sears handbook detracted in any way from the language
in the application or . . . provided a reasonable
basis for the conclusion that plaintiffs were employed
under a "for cause" contract. The fact that certain
acts were identified as conduct that might lead to
discharge did not indicate that these acts were the
exclusive permissible grounds for discharge.
Significantly, the Sixth Circuit noted that, regardless of
the reasons for discharge, the employer was within its rights
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when it discharged an employee whose contract was terminable at
will either with or without cause.

See also, Johnson v.

National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976)
(wherein an employee sought to avoid the at-will rule by
asserting that an employee handbook created an express or
implied contract; the court held that the handbook was only a
unilateral expression of company policies and procedures not
bargained for by the parties that any benefits conferred by it
were mere gratuities, and that there was no meeting of the
minds regarding the handbook as evidenced by its unilateral
publication by the company); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
448 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (where the court held that
an employee's handbook cannot be construed to be a contract;
its purpose is to inform employees of benefits, privileges and
corporate policies).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiffs'
contractual wrongful discharge claim was properly dismissed.
The

record establishes

that the Nordstrom manual

is a

unilateral statement by the company, was not bargained for by
plaintiffs, nor was it relied on by them in accepting employment because they didn't even see it until after they started
work for Nordstrom.

Tr. Vol. II, 29-31, 123. Accordingly, the

manual cannot create a binding employment agreement.

In any

event, as shown in Nordstrom's opening brief, Nordstrom did
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terminate plaintiffs' employment for grounds listed in the
manual.

See Brief of Appellant, at 36-39.

Hence, the trial

court's dismissal of plaintiffs' wrongful termination claim
based on an implied contract should be affirmed.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Granted a Directed Verdict as
to Plaintiffs' Defamation Claims.

On July 20, 1981, immediately after James Nordstrom and
Robert Bender advised Dennis Knapp that his employment was
terminated, they called a meeting of buyers and managers at the
Crossroads

Plaza

Nordstrom

store.

At

the

meeting,

Mr. Nordstrom announced that Knapp had been released as general
manager and that he was to be replaced by Darrel Hume.

In

response to a question as to the reason for Knapp's termination, Mr. Nordstrom stated something to the effect that it was
for poor judgment concerning a drug-related problem.

Tr. Vol.

II, 109, 110, 188, 189, 190; Vol. Ill, 96, 97, 98, 104, 205,
206.
At the meeting, someone else asked what buyers and managers
should tell their employees.
as to Mr. Nordstrom's answer.

There was conflicting testimony
As indicated in respondents'

brief, some witnesses testified that Mr. Nordstrom said they
i

should tell them that it had to do with drugs. At least one of
plaintiffs' witnesses, however, testified that Mr. Nordstrom
<

-20-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

expressly stated that he did not want the reasons for the
termination discussed with employees.

Tr. Vol. Ill, 179-180.

Two other witnesses, including plaintiff Cathy Brehany at her
deposition, had no recall of Mr. Nordstrom making any statement
as to what the buyers and managers should tell their
employees.

Tr. Vol. II, 189-190; Vol. Ill, 104.

The next day, July 21, 1981, after the employment of all
three plaintiffs had been terminated, Darrel Hume, the new
general manager, held another meeting of buyers and managers.
At that meeting he stated that Nordstrom would not tolerate
drug use, and that anyone using drugs should resign.

Tr. Vol.

Ill, 98, 99, 126, 127, 133, 134, Vol. IV, 21, 22.
The above-described statements made at these two meetings
with management-level employees are the only statements claimed
by plaintiffs to be defamatory.

On its motion for directed

verdict, Nordstrom argued, and the trial court agreed, that the
alleged defamatory statements were not actionable because:
1.

All statements claimed to be defamatory were
qualifiedly privileged and are not actionable
because there was no malice;

2.

All allegedly defamatory statements were true; and

3.

The plaintiffs' defamation claims are defeated by
their own publication of the alleged defamatory
statements.

This court should affirm the trial court's directed verdict
for the same reasons.
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1.

Defendant's Alleged Defamatory Statements Are
Qualifiedly Privileged and Were Made Without
Malice.

This court should uphold the trial court's determination
that the alleged defamatory statements were privileged and not
actionable.

Under Utah law a privileged publication is one

made:
In a communication, without malice, to a person
interested therein, by one who is also interested, or
by one who stands in such relation to the person
interested as to afford a reasonable ground for
supposing the motive for the communication innocent,
or who is requested by the person interested to give
the information.
Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3(3) (1953, as amended); See also, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-506 (1953, as amended).
This privilege is also stated in Utah case law.

In Lind v.

Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that, M[i]t has long been held that communications
between persons who share a common business interest are qualifiedly privileged and not libelous in the absence of malice."
See also Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co. , 119 Utah 407, 228
P.2d 272 (1951) (wherein the Utah Supreme Court adopted and
applied this same qualified privilege); Restatement (2d) of
Torts § 594 (1977).
It

is well-established

jurisdictions

both

that this qualified

in Utah and in other
privilege

protects

an
i
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employer's communication to employees, or other interested
parties, of the reasons for an employee's discharge.

See,

e.g. , Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397
(Utah 1977) (wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that an
employer's alleged defamatory statements made on a "blue slip"
regarding

the

reasons for an employee's discharge were

conditionally privileged); Sowell v. IML Freight, Inc., 30 Utah
2d 446, 519 P.2d 884, 885 (1974) (wherein the Utah Supreme
Court held that a letter from an employer's sending to a union
a copy of a letter to an employee notifying the employee of his
termination for reckless conduct was qualifiedly privileged as
a communication between interested parties).
In Deaile v. General Telephone Co.,

40 Cal. App. 3d 841,

115 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1974), a plaintiff sued a former employer
for defamation where the employer had fired the plaintiff for
lying about the causes for her absence from work.

The employer

subsequently communicated the reason for plaintiff's discharge
to supervisors and operators in the facility to correct rumored
information and to preserve employee morale and efficiency.
The court in Deaile held that such communications are privileged under a California qualified privilege statute which is
essentially similar to Utah's, as the communications were of a
kind reasonably calculated to protect or further a common
interest of both the communicator and the recipients.
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See also

Kroger Co. v. Young, 210 Va. 564; 172 S.E.2d 720 (1970)
(wherein the court held that communications of an employer to
his employees of the reason for discharge are qualifiedly
privileged); Ponticelli v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 104 R.I.
549, 247 A.2d 303 (1968) (wherein the court stated that where a
supervisor stated to a limited group of co-workers that an
employee had been discharged for padding production figures,
the statements were qualifiedly privileged because the supervisor's

interest

in protecting his employer

from being

defrauded required that he state the reasons for the discharge
to co-workers who might thereby be discouraged from engaging in
similar practices); Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Renno, 173 Miss.
609, 157 So. 705 (1934) (wherein the court held that statements
made by a distributing agent of an oil company to service
station keepers and truck drivers that a former service station
keeper had been discharged because of bootlegging were qualifiedly privileged as being a matter for consideration and
discussion among such parties as they pertain to the success of
the business at hand).
Based on the foregoing authorities, this court should
conclude as a matter of law that the statements made at the
July 20 and 21 meetings were qualifiedly privileged, because
Nordstrom executives made the statements only to managementlevel employees, Nordstrom buyers and department managers, and
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the statements directly concerned the conditions of employment
or responsibilities of those buyers and department managers in
at least the following ways:

(1) the statements related to the

replacement of their immediate supervisor, Dennis Knapp; (2)
they related to the success of Nordstrom's business in Salt
Lake City in which all buyers and managers and other employees
had a direct pecuniary interest because of the company's profit
sharing plan in which all company employees participated, and
because increased business would enhance employees' commission
income as well as their overall job security; and (3) they
related to the expectations concerning the behavior of those
buyers and managers as well as the employees they supervised,
whose conduct was the responsibility of those buyers and
managers, and served to discourage similar conduct among such
employees.
Additionally, under Utah Code Ann. § 5-2-3(3) (1953, as
amended), statements are privileged which are made in response
to

requests

for

information

by

an

interested

person.

Similarly, the Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 595 (1977), which
is cited by plaintiffs at page 37 of their brief, states:
(2) In determining whether a publication is within
the generally accepted standards of decent conduct it
is an important factor that
(a) The publication is made in response to a
request rather than volunteered by the publisher . . .
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The undisputed testimony at trial was that the allegedly
defamatory statements referred to at page 3 of plaintiffs*
brief were made in response to questions from persons present
at the July 20 meeting at which James Nordstrom announced
Dennis Knapp's discharge.

That Mr. Nordstrom's allegedly

defamatory statements were made in response to questions gives
further weight to the conclusion that those statements were
privileged, and should be given considerable latitude.
The case of Haddad v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 526 F.2d 83
(6th Cir. 1976), which is relied on heavily by plaintiffs in
their brief for the proposition that the conditional privilege
does not arise in the instant case, is contrary to the weight
of authority cited above and is also distinguishable factually
from the case at bar.

In Sears, the court based its holding on

the fact that the defamatory statements were made to nonmanagerial employees.

While Nordstrom does not concede that

the privilege should not apply when statements are made under
such circumstances, here there is no dispute that the statements at issue were made to managerial employees of Nordstrom,
and therefore are privileged even under the Sears case.
As the alleged defamatory statements were qualifiedly
privileged, plaintiffs can prevail on their defamation claim
only if they established that the statements were made with
malice.

Traditionally, the Utah courts have stated that the
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malice necessary

to

overcome

improper motive, such

a conditional

privilege

is

as desire to do harm, or that the

defendant did not honestly believe his statements to be true,
or that the publication was excessive.

Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL,

Inc. , 551 P.2d

However, in the more

222, 225 (Utah 1976).

recent case of Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah
1981), the Utah Supreme Court stated that a qualified privilege
can only be overcome by proof of "actual malice," and that the
burden of proving actual malice is on the plaintiff.

16.

at

976 and n.5, citing, Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing
Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1 (1933).
In Seegmiller, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "actual
malice" is defined to mean "a deliberate misrepresentation or a
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement."
626 P.2d at 971, citing, New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S.

254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964).

The court

also noted that a "reckless disregard for truth" is defined as
follows:
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a
reasonably prudent man would have published, or would
have investigated before publishing. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts
shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and
demonstrates actual malice.
626 P.2d at 972, citing, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1968).
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Significantly, the United States Supreme Court in St. Amant
v. Thompson, supra, held that a plaintiff in a defamation
action failed to establish reckless disregard for truth even
where the defendant had made defamatory statements about the
plaintiff and the defendant had no personal knowledge of the
plaintiff's activities, had relied solely on a third-party
affidavit even though the record was silent as to the third
party's reputation for veracity, had failed to verify the
information with those who might have known the true facts, and
had given no consideration as to whether his statements would
defame the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court further defined the

concept of "reckless disregard for the truth" as follows:
[The] mere proof of failure to investigate,
without more, cannot establish reckless disregard
for the truth, rather, the publisher must act
with a "high degree of awareness of . . .
probable falsity."
Gertz v, Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332, 94 S. Ct. 2997,
41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 801 (1974).
The evidence at trial clearly established that the statements made at the July 20 and 21 meetings were made without
actual malice.

The reference to drugs in the statements were

based on an investigation made by defendants in which several
individuals reported, and at least two persons specifically
confirmed, that the plaintiffs were involved in drug-related
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activities.

Based on the information James Nordstrom received,

one cannot determine that he acted with a reckless disregard
for the truth or entertained serious doubt as to statements
made at the July 20 meeting.

Even Dennis Knapp testified that

he had had a close relationship with James Nordstrom prior to
his termination, that Mr. Nordstrom expressed remorse to him
about the termination, and that in times prior Mr. Nordstrom
had also spoken highly of Cathy Brehany.

Tr., Vol. II, 85-86.

Darrel Hume did not even call the July 21 meeting.
Vol. VII, 7.
City.

Id.

Tr.

It was set up before he arrived in Salt Lake

His statement was nothing more than a reiteration

of Nordstrom*s policy that employees should refrain from use of
illegal drugs.
In sum, Nordstrom* s actions were taken in what was
perceived as the best interest of the company.

James Nordstrom

terminated Dennis Knapp*s employment because he had made poor
decisions regarding the people that worked for him which could
have brought strong negative reflection upon Nordstrom in the
Salt Lake area.

Even under the traditional malice standard,

there is absolutely no evidence that the allegedly defamatory
statements were made with any ill will or desire to do harm to
plaintiffs.

Contrary to plaintiff's claims of excessive publi-

cation, the statements were brief, restrained, not volunteered
and were made to only a selected group of management level
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employees at the Crossroads Plaza store.

Certainly, under the

circumstances, no malice can be imputed to Nordstrom.
This court should determine that Cathy Brehany's defamation
claim was properly dismissed on the further ground that
Brehany's Amended Complaint failed to even raise the issue of
malice, much less plead any specific facts which would tend to
support a claim of malice.

R. C82-5828, 109-110.

In Lind v.

Lynch, supra, 665 P.2d at 1279, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that where the qualified privilege applies, if no issue
of malice is raised in the pleadings, the trial court could
properly grant a motion for summary judgment on a defamation
claim.

See also, Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257 (Okla. 1976),

(where the court held that a complaint charging defendants with
conduct that was reckless, willful, wanton, malicious, unlawful
and grossly negligent, was not sufficient to allege malice when
there was no evidentiary facts pled in the complaint to support
the legal conclusion of maliciousness).
The allegedly defamatory statements having been conditionally privileged, and made without malice, the trial court's
directed verdict was properly granted.

In addition, Brehany's

failure to even plead malice further justifies the dismissal of
her defamation claim.

\
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2.

All Alleged Defamatory Statements Made by Defendants
Were True.

Truth is a complete defense to the allegedly defamatory
statements made at the July 20 and 21 meetings.
Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976).

Ogden Bus

The Utah Supreme

Court has recently reaffirmed that a party can avail itself of
the defense of truth to a defamation claim if the defamatory
statement is true in substance.

Specifically, the Court stated

as follows:
To establish the defense of truth, "it is not necessary to prove the literal truth of the precise statement made. Insignificant inaccuracies of expression
are immaterial, providing that the defamatory charge
is true in substance."
Auto West, Inc. v. Baggs, 678 P.2d 286, 290-91 (Utah 1984),
citing Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 127, 247 P.2d 264, 266
(1952).
The allegedly defamatory statements in this case constitute
at most nothing more than general statements that plaintiffs'
terminations were related to drugs.

The plaintiffs' own admis-

sions at trial demonstrate that each of them had involvement
with drugs.
Dennis Knapp admitted to using both marijuana and cocaine
while a Nordstrom employee.
being

aware of

He also admitted to seeing or

several of his managerial

employees

using

illegal drugs while he was general manager in Utah, and that he
did nothing to discourage their drug use.
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Barbara Knapp admitted to using illegal drugs frequently
while employed by Nordstrom.

Cathy Brehany admitted regularly

being in the presence of a number of her friends and associates
while they used drugs, and that she offered to arrange for four
of her friends to obtain cocaine from an acquaintance of hers,
Jody Bernafo, whom she understood to be a regular user

of

cocaine.
This evidence provides a further basis for affirming

the

trial court's directed verdict.
3.

Plaintiffs'
Plaintiffs'
Statements.

Defamation
Publication

Claim is Defeated
by
of the Alleged Defamatory

An essential element in a defamation claim is that the
defendants publish or communicate the defamatory matter.
Code Ann. § 45-2-2

(1953, as amended); Restatement

Utah

(2d) of

Torts, § 558 (1977).
In Church of Scientology of California, Inc. v. Green, 354
F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court held that:
There is no publication if the defamatory statement is
exposed to a third party by the person claiming to be
defamed . . . .
Id. at 804

(citations

omitted).

See

also,

Shoemaker

v.

Friedberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 911, 183 P.2d 318 (1947); Kemper v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.
Ohio 1973).
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In the instant case, plaintiffs admit they repeatedly published to numerous Nordstrom employees and others the defamatory statements which they alleged defendants made.

Dennis

Knapp admitted telling several co-employees even before his
termination that he was going to be discharged for drug use.
Tr., Vol. II, 59-62.

Likewise, Cathy Brehany testified that on

the day she was fired she told several employees of the Salt
Lake City and downtown Seattle Nordstrom stores that she had
been accused of drug involvement and shortly thereafter told
several others the same thing.

Tr. Vol. II, 193-98.

Accord-

ingly, plaintiffs cannot now claim that Nordstrom is responsible for publication of defamatory statements regarding them.
Moreover, any damages allegedly suffered by plaintiffs would be
speculative, because it would be impossible to determine
whether plaintiffs were in fact damaged by defendants' alleged
publication or by their own publication of the allegedly
defamatory statements.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and Nordstrom's opening brief, this
court should reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment
favoring plaintiffs and against Nordstrom, and affirm the trial
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court's directed verdict on plaintiffs' contractual wrongful
discharge and defamation claims.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 1986.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Stanle^K Preston
Attorneys for Appellant/
Cross-Respondent
SCMSJH1
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